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Negotiating energy democracy in practice:
governance processes in community energy projects
Bregje Van Veelen
Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
There is a growing ‘energy democracy’ (ED) movement which regards the transi-
tion to renewable energy as an opportunity for socio-economic transformation, as
well as technological innovation. The literature on ED tends to associate greater
democratic control of energy systems with increased community control over the
means of energy generation and distribution. Nonetheless, this literature often
assumes rather than demonstrates that the forms of governance it promotes are
more democratic than the status quo. This analysis contributes to the emerging
field of ED by assessing the complex and varied ways in which communities in
Scotland practise energy governance. By focusing on three key governance
processes (decision-making, accountability and dispute resolution), the impor-
tance of local contexts for the establishment and negotiation of democratic
practices is demonstrated. This local specificity, however, also raises further
questions regarding the universal applicability of the ED concept.
KEYWORDS Energy democracy; community governance; inclusivity; energy governance; Scotland
Introduction
There are growing signs that a global energy transition is underway, with
renewable sources gradually replacing fossil fuels. In 2014, renewable energy
accounted for 19% of global final energy consumption and this percentage
continues to grow (REN21 2016). Previous energy transitions (waterpower to
coal, and coal to oil) show that broad social and geographical change underpins
major changes to energy systems. These potential transformational impacts of
the current energy transition have, however, thus far received relatively little
attention (Bridge et al. 2013, Sovacool 2014). This is, however, beginning to
change. More recently, researchers and practitioners have begun to emphasise
the role of social, economic and political power in energy transitions, most
explicitly expressed through concepts of energy justice and energy democracy
(ED) (Weis et al. 2015).
The notion of ‘energy democracy’ has become a focal point for civil
society groups involved in disparate struggles around energy issues (Angel
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2016). While there is no set definition, civil society organisations use the
term ‘energy democracy’ to link decarbonisation with changes to who
controls the means of energy production and distribution (Strachan et al.
2015). These organisations see the decentralised nature of renewable energy
technologies as an opportunity for ‘genuine popular control over energy
choices’ (McHarg 2016, p.313). For many in this civic movement, this
‘genuine popular control’ takes the form of greater community control of
resources (e.g. Anthony 2012, Cumbers et al. 2013, Vansintjan 2015). They
consider community and cooperative energy groups as the ‘ideal organisa-
tional entities’ (Carrilho Da Graça and Gomes 2016, p.3) in which ‘indivi-
duals participate actively in decision-making’ (REN21 2016, p.135). As
such, advocates for greater ED see community action as an opportunity
to tackle energy issues in ways that meet communities’ needs and enrich
them (Anthony 2012, Weinrub and Giancatarino 2015). Thus, proponents
of community ownership envisage it as a ‘third way’, an alternative to both
. . .. public ownership, with its highly attenuated (representative) democratic
control over arm’s-length and centralised public corporations, and privatisa-
tion, with its illusory promise of individual empowerment through share-
holder democracy and consumer sovereignty. (McHarg 2016, p.16)
There is a tendency, however, to assume rather than demonstrate that
community projects are more democratic or just (McHarg 2016). In other
words, there is a risk that advocates fall into what Purcell (2006) has labelled
the ‘local trap’, with generalisations made about the quality of projects based
on their scale. Additionally, it risks perpetuating the notion that community
organisations are willing and able to provide the democratic functions
expected of them (Little 2002).
Recently, calls for ED through greater community control have begun to
transcend social movements, gaining the attention of policy-makers (e.g. David
2016, Party 2016) and researchers (e.g. McHarg 2016, Angel 2017). A more
critical analysis of the assumptions underpinning the calls for greater ED is
therefore very timely. This research does this by demonstrating how community
energy (CE) groups establish and negotiate democratic processes. It focuses on
three key processes deemed critical to democratic energy governance but for
which limited empirical evidence is currently available: decision-making (John
2014, Kunze and Becker 2014), accountability (Chavez 2015, Weinrub and
Giancatarino 2015) and dispute resolution (McHarg 2016). I have chosen the
community-level focus because the apparent democratic nature of CE groups
needs to be better understood before their potential to contribute to the demo-
cratisation of the energy system can be considered. This research highlights that
CE projects can contribute to greater democratic governance of energy resources
but that they also experience barriers and tensions that need overcoming when
seeking to achieve greater ED.
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ED – an opportunity for more just outcomes?
The emerging body of literature on ED frames discussions around energy
resources explicitly as social struggles (Weis et al. 2015). Invoking partici-
patory notions of democracy (Somerville 2005), advocates present commu-
nity-level governance of energy resources as an opportunity not just to
produce clean energy or deliver social benefits (e.g. Walker et al. 2007,
Warren and Malcolm 2010, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Walton 2012, The
Scottish Government 2015b), but to fundamentally reshape the social,
economic and political relations embedded in these Megawatts.
Schlosberg (2013) refers to such notions of participatory, sustainable
resource governance as sustainable materialism: addressing environmental
conditions as the basis for social justice. The sustainable materialist view
seeks not just to resist, but to reconstruct practices of production and
consumption, and to (sustainably) rebuild the material relationships we
have with resources we use (Schlosberg 2013). The ED movement echoes
these sentiments:
[The] vision of a democratized energy future includes an informed and
conscious community that understands the right relationship of people to
natural resources and the need to live in ecological balance. (Weinrub and
Giancatarino 2015, p.4 – emphasis added by the author)
Thus, it shifts the focus away from individualist responses to climate and
environmental issues to a collective focus on the rethinking and redesigning of
processes and institutions connected to meeting basic needs (Schlosberg 2013).
Advocates often consider direct involvement of communities and other
civil society groups in energy governance, a key part of this process.
Proponents argue that through greater community participation and con-
trol, participation in decisions around energy is more inclusive (Kunze and
Becker 2014), ensuring decisions are more representative (Vansintjan
2015), and with greater opportunity to hold decision-makers to account
(John 2015, Weinrub and Giancatarino 2015). In other words, it sees local,
collective action as an opportunity for cooperation through which shared
values can emerge (Tam 1988). The emergence of such shared values is in
turn deemed to contribute to a ‘more sustainable relationship between just
communities and a working environment’ (Schlosberg 2013, p.49, also
Weinrub and Giancatarino 2015).
Democratisation through decentralisation?
By framing discussions around energy as social struggles with the aim to
disrupt the relations embedded in current energy systems, the ED movement
presents itself as deeply political. Nonetheless, the view with which it is
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associated – of community-level governance as morally virtuous – appears
more closely aligned with orthodox communitarians’ views of communities as
having a natural, dominant moral voice which ensures they do the ‘right’ thing
(Little 2002, Taylor Aiken 2015). Scholars, however, have criticised this notion
of these ‘mythic communities’ (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, p.638) of homo-
genous populations where locally evolved norms and collaborative processes
help to manage resources (more) sustainably and equitably (also, Dalby and
Mackenzie 1997, Featherstone et al. 2012, Taylor Aiken 2014). As Taylor Aiken
(2015) also observes, ‘community’ has come to imply both a normative good
and a direct correlation of ‘green’. This is also evident among ED advocates
who, while seeing them as part of larger political struggles, frame communities
themselves as apolitical.
However, key political theorists (such as McConnell 1966, Young 1990,
Edwards 2009) have criticised the assumption that community action
creates desirable outcomes. Recent empirical work that has considered the
role of communities in energy and sustainability governance also questions
this (e.g. Walker et al. 2007, 2010, Creamer 2015, Taylor Aiken 2015,
Simcock 2016). Those who have cautioned against the presumption that
decentralised, community action equals democratic or just processes and
outcomes have often done so for two key reasons: difference and inequality.
I consider these in more detail below.
Scholars have often deemed shared interests essential in the successful
development of CE projects (Haggett and Quiroz-Aitken 2015, Islar and
Busch 2016). In their pursuit of common interests, communities can,
however, (inadvertently) create an atmosphere of conformity and homo-
geneity that stifles dissent (Young 1990, Little 2002). Others have therefore
advocated for an ‘agonistic pluralism’ that legitimises dissent and debate in
(community) governance, arguing that the democratic qualities of civil
society are rooted in social mobilisation and contestation as well as in
cooperation and civicness (Mouffe 2000, Anderson et al. 2016, Islar and
Busch 2016). For these authors, difference or dissent is not simply to be
ignored, overcome or stifled through consensus (Anderson et al. 2016), but
to be recognised, validated and, from there, possibly negotiated.
Islar and Busch (2016) have suggested that negotiating differences in CE
governance requires an open and inclusive process. Others have warned,
however, that we should not assume that decentralised governance will be
more inclusive or equal. Rather, community groups can be ‘arenas for
personal ambition and power as well as sacrifice and service’ (Edwards
2009, p.44). For those sceptical of the links between forms and norms of
governance, community governance simply signifies a change in scale, with
the local distribution of power determining the outcomes of material and
symbolic contests among actors (Lane and Corbett 2005). When seeking to
develop an inclusive community project, it is therefore important to
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consider the patchwork of concerns and interests that exist within a place,
and the power relations between them (McMorran et al. 2014, Creamer
2015, Grossmann and Creamer 2017). This is pertinent to CE groups, who
might manage and distribute substantial sums of money (Walker et al.
2010, Bristow et al. 2012). While thus framed as an opportunity for
disadvantaged communities (Weinrub and Giancatarino 2015), findings
from research on CE and environmental projects show that participation
is often limited to those in higher socio-economic groups (Angel 2016,
Grossmann and Creamer 2017). Kearns (1995) has described this as the
conundrum of democratic governance: the more participatory democracy
becomes, the more it risks exacerbating existing inequalities.
To ensure that existing differences and power relations are not simply
reproduced, it is therefore important to consider community governance
institutions and practices (Kearns 1995, Simcock 2016). This research seeks
to analyse three related practices of democratic governance to understand
how these intersect with difference and inequality in community-led pro-
jects. The understanding that ideology or institutional features (structures,
rules and laws) affect but do not necessarily determine or guarantee good
practice has informed my focus on democratic practices (Fox 1992, Edwards
2009). A greater consideration of governance practices enables an under-
standing of how different individuals and groups negotiate relationships,
and how contradictions and tensions emerge and are possibly overcome
(Young 1990, DeFilippis et al. 2006, Edwards 2009).
CE in Scotland
The empirical setting for this research is Scotland, where ED is becoming
an increasingly important issue. The Scottish Government has set targets to
generate 100% of electricity demand from renewable sources by 2020 (The
Scottish Government 2011b). Through the introduction of various support
mechanisms since 2002 (The Scottish Government 2006, 2013), CE in
Scotland is overrepresented compared to other parts of the United
Kingdom (Bomberg and McEwen 2012). Furthermore, in 2016, the
Director of Energy and Climate Change at the Scottish Government
announced that the future for renewable energy in Scotland is ‘localised,
democratised and mutualised’ (Stark 2016). This is the first time it has
incorporated the notion of ED in official government discourse. Again, this
stands in contrast to the UK level, where the idea has not (yet) gained
traction in official government discourse. While there is a well-established
ED movement in Germany (see Kunze and Becker 2014, Weis et al. 2015,
Angel 2017), evidence regarding the forms, practices and outcomes of ED
outside the German context is currently limited. The focus on ED in
Scotland – not a pioneer such as Germany, but one where the concept of
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ED has transcended social movements to become recognised by govern-
ment officials – therefore offers the opportunity to enrich the evidence base
and evaluate how the notion of ED is translated into new national contexts.
CE in Scotland is also part of a broader trend of decentralisation and
community-led development in Scotland (The Scottish Government 2011a,
2015a, 2015b, 2015c, van Veelen 2017). According to one civil servant, the
growing role for, primarily place based, communities has been based on the
belief that such communities need to balance competing demands, and
their resource management practices therefore inherently benefit the gen-
eral good of the people in that area (private correspondence, 2015). Again,
these (presumed) links between community-level action and improved
outcomes warrant further investigation.
Finally, Scotland makes an interesting case study due to the diverse
forms of CE in Scotland (van Veelen 2017; Table 1). This diversity of
approaches and associated legal and organisational models stands in con-
trast with the universalist claims made for community governance – as
shown above. Using Scotland as a case study therefore enables an analysis
in greater detail of this issue of local particularity versus universal demo-
cratic claims.
Methods
Research reported here is part of a larger project that examined the govern-
ance of CE in Scotland. To capture the diversity of the sector, my research
adopts a broad approach, engaging with 15 community groups across
Scotland (Table 1). I selected groups to represent the five different types
of CE groups in Scotland identified by van Veelen (2017). In total, I
conducted 39 in-depth interviews between 2013 and 2016.
In most groups (CG4–15), I interviewed one or two employees or voluntary
board members, but I conducted more extensive case study research with
CG1–3. In these three cases, I interviewed a greater number of community
groupmembers, as well as local residents not actively involved in the projects. I
conducted 31 interviews face-to-face, and eight by phone. Interviews varied in
length between 30 and 150 min. I transcribed the interviews verbatim and
analysed them through thematic coding in NVIVO. Documentary analysis of
planning applications, news reports and community groups’ websites supple-
ments the interview data. Due to the sensitive nature of some responses, I have
removed all identifying features.
I chose the mixed approach of breadth and depth for two reasons. The
choice for breadth was important because this research explores the varied
experiences of democratic governance across different types of CE. In doing
so, it complements previous research (e.g. Simcock 2016) which has pro-
vided a rich and detailed account of decision-making processes in a single
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case study. The larger number of cases enables this research to highlight the
breadth of experiences and identify common features and challenges. This
research also recognises, however, that governance is a complex process and
that interviews with community leaders alone only paint a partial picture.
Therefore, I selected for further research three groups with a greater variety
of stakeholders.
Results
The community groups included in this study, despite their different focuses,
generally have similar organisational arrangements in place. Approximately half
the groups in this study rely solely on volunteers. In those cases, the voluntary
governing body (such as a board of directors) are responsible for both strategic
governance and day-to-day decision-making. The other half have at least one
paid staffmember responsible for day-to-day decision-making, with the govern-
ing body responsible for strategic governance. In both cases, the wider member-
ship of the organisation forms another pillar of governance, to which the





Type (based on van
Veelen 2017)









CG3 2006 Wind Medium Cooperatives
CG4 2010 Solar Under consideration Transition towns
CG5 2009 Wind Small Small is beautiful




CG7 2004 Wind Large Community
developers
CG8 2013 Solar Under consideration Small is beautiful
CG9 2013 Hydro Small Community
developers




CG11 2013 Wind Medium Cooperatives
CG12 2005 Wind Large Community
developers
CG13 1999 Wind Medium Community
developers




CG15 2008 Hydro; wind Medium Community
developers
aScale refers to the size of the technology that is community-owned. To help ensure the anonymity of
these groups, the following categories for installation size have been used: micro <15 kW, small 16–
100 kW, medium 101–1000 kW, large >1000 kW.
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governing body is accountable. Participation in organisations’ governance by
their wider membership generally takes three forms: participation in an Annual
General Meeting (AGM, during which members of the governing body are
elected), community ballots on key decisions and informal engagement. A
governing document defines the relationship between members and the govern-
ing body. Despite commonalities in organisational structures, I identified sig-
nificant differences in governance practices. The following three sections will
explore in more detail how communities shape democratic governance, and the
relation between the different pillars of governance. It will do so by focusing on
three governance aspects: decision-making practices, accountability procedures
and dispute resolution.
Inclusivity in decision-making: ‘local leaders’ versus broad
engagement
Scholars have attributed the potential of community-owned energy projects
to contribute to greater ED primarily to their potential for influencing
decision-making, where ideally ‘the greatest number of people directly
affected by a project should hold as large a power of [. . .] decision-making
as possible’ (Kunze and Becker 2014, p.9). However, as this analysis shows,
active participation is often limited, raising questions about leaders’ repre-
sentativeness of the wider community.
Many of the community groups included in this study aspire to broad-based
participation and engagement in decision-making. However, for practical
reasons, most groups mix representative forms of governance with participa-
tory ones. These groups have two key moments when the wider membership
can have their say on proposed developments: during a community consulta-
tion and a ballot. Although an important part of the development process,
community groups often set up these engagement opportunities to gauge or
gain support for a project, rather than influence its details:
The community were consulted at length regarding the permissions to
develop. They weren’t consulted regarding the structure of the finance [. . .],
which does come back and hit us. (CG9, employee)
Some interviewees felt that this set up worked best for everyone and that
community members seem to have no desire to be consulted more often.
Instead, members are often content to leave staff and directors of the
community organisation ‘to just get on with it’ (CG2, general member).
Groups’ reports of low attendance figures at their AGMs and their difficulty
in attracting new Directors appear to confirm this assertion that many
members have no desire for greater involvement.
Reliance on a small number of people can be a double-edged sword.
Both interview respondents and the literature (Van Der Schoor and
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Scholtens 2015, Martiskainen 2017) often attribute the successful develop-
ment of a project to having ‘local leaders’ (CG3, board member) involved in
projects’ governing bodies. Interviewees indicated that having confident
and competent community leaders was essential not only to successfully
manage complex CE projects but also for convincing the wider community
of the feasibility and importance of the project.
Nonetheless, interview responses indicated that there might be (hidden)
barriers to participation, which reinforce existing community relations and
hierarchies. Especially in rural areas, it is an often-heard complaint that it is
‘always the same people’, or ‘the usual suspects’ who are involved in commu-
nity governing bodies (CG1, employee; CG2, board member; see also
Creamer 2015, Simcock 2016). The frequent involvement of a small number
of people in community projects can also raise concerns regarding these
leaders’ representativeness of the wider community, not least because com-
munity leaders often were similar in age, gender and/or socio-economic
background. While some interviewees deemed the continued reliance on a
small group of local leaders a necessity or an inevitability, others were more
critical. These critics argued that a lack of diversity not only affects governing
bodies’ ability to represent the diverse interests of the wider community but
that this could also be detrimental to the quality of decisions made:
The minute we [the first female Board members] went in there we started
bringing up different issues. You could see on the faces of the other board
members that they were like ‘oh, we never thought of that’. Literally things
that were just rubber stamped [. . .] This is what we talk about, when we talk
about diversity. That people are willing to challenge things without first
subscribing to the, what’s the word, groupthink. (CG3, board member)
Some CE groups recognised that their approach of ‘passive inclusivity’
(Grossmann and Creamer 2017) did not necessarily break down participa-
tion barriers. In response, these groups have become more proactive in
their recruitment to encourage a more representative governing body:
[The] board was of an age, and of a particular gender. That was recognised,
and we needed to do more. We just had an open evening, a bit of a social
evening, it was an open invitation to anybody, but we also specifically
targeted folk to come by and try and break down the barriers of maybe
some of the assumptions of what it was like to be a director of a charity.
(CG13, employee)
This proactive approach takes various forms, depending on local circum-
stances and priorities. Some groups have set quotas, for example to ensure
that the directors reflect either the age or geographical distribution of the
wider community. Others have tried to improve their diversity through
more informal means, for example by proactively asking women or young
members to join the board. It is, however, interesting to note that many
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groups who have started to take active measures to improve the diversity of
their boards have only begun to do so after their energy projects were built.
As one board member said, her fellow board members care about issues of
diversity and representation in principle, but in practice, they often deem
them of secondary importance:
[The issue of representation and diversity] does come up, but . . . it’s con-
sidered as an add-on. [. . .] they don’t really look at the leadership and
themselves, in my opinion, enough. People don’t really want to challenge
themselves, do they? And they’re quite comfortable in what they’re doing.
That’s a very natural position probably, but it’s not. . .. It’s not, diverse, is it?
It’s not representative. It’s not very proactive in changing anything for the
better. (CG3, board member)
Furthermore, groups that have begun to address the issue of access to
decision-making procedures (labelled ‘external exclusion’ by Young 2000)
may find that internal forms of exclusion continue to persist. These may
include an unwillingness to speak in meetings due to (perceived) power
differentials or not having one’s opinion considered. One interviewee
gave the example of their participation in another cooperative where a
female board member had tried to challenge the other, male, committee
members:
At that time the group board was quite traditionalist. They had somebody
there who was a senior person, who was a very good businessman, it was
quite difficult challenging all of that. And she challenged it in a very simplistic
way and she was just . . . with humour actually. And that wasn’t thought well
of. (CG3, board member)
Nonetheless, this interviewee felt that a continuing focus on inclusivity and
diversity may slowly erode internal forms of exclusion.
To summarise, groups often desire inclusive participation and open
exchange. Although some are taking active steps to achieve this, others
see it as something of secondary importance. Second, as the latter part of
this section shows, even when attempts that include a greater diversity of
members in the governing body occur, this does not guarantee that barriers
to inclusive participation have been overcome. Internal forms of exclusion
may persist.
Accountability of decision-makers
The previous section showed that a small group of people made most of the
decisions in these CE groups. It is therefore important to consider how
these decision-makers are held to account. To ensure that decisions are
made in the best interest of the community and the influence of individuals
is kept in check, the groups in this study have adopted procedures to ensure
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accountability both towards community members and outside bodies such
as funders. My focus here is specifically on internal responsibility towards
members, rather than outside agencies.
Interviews showed that groups pay varying degrees of attention to
accountability and oversight procedures. While most have received advice
about legal forms and decision-making and accountability procedures, this
may have been many years ago. Groups’ circumstances and activities often
change over time, with the result that to a greater or lesser extent, com-
munities ‘figure out’ governance and accountability procedures ‘as we go
along’ (community group [CG] 13, employee; CG9, board member). This,
however, has the effect that even if official accountability procedures are in
place, they are not always followed. Interviewees gave three explanations for
this: a lack of active members with sufficient time and knowledge, pressure
to meet tight deadlines and the increasing complexity of projects and
organisational structures.
As the previous section noted, a small number of volunteers run many
CE groups. These volunteers – especially in the small rural communities
where many projects are based – are often also involved in other commu-
nity affairs. One example included in this study concerns an island with
approximately 60 adult residents. Around 20 of these are actively involved
in local community groups, of which there are five. Many active residents
are therefore involved in multiple activities and governing bodies, in addi-
tion to their day job. Similar situations were observed in other rural
communities. One staff member of a CE group noted that despite board
members’ best intentions, it is not always possible for them to invest the
time needed to oversee the development of lengthy and increasingly com-
plex energy projects:
Part of it is lack of understanding that it is their role [to set the guidelines],
but a lot of it is lack of capacity to do it, because they’re actually the core of
the economy here, and they can’t run their own businesses and run as
volunteers a very demanding business that is doing ambitious and innovative
things as well. (CG10, employee)
This lack of time and possibly understanding can, inadvertently, risk under-
mining a group’s efforts to successfully establish energy projects. In two
cases included in this study, individuals felt compelled to make key deci-
sions with little oversight. As they deemed their projects’ completion to be
at risk, they took decisions without their group boards’ knowledge or
approval:
[The Board’s] conclusion was, that this is too risky. [. . .] I just ignored the
board’s decision and carried on working on it, getting an agreement in place
that protected shares, that protected investors. A month later I said to the
board: ‘I’m going to explain to you why you can’t stick to the decision you
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made last time’. So, we had another meeting and they were kind of ‘alright,
okay, we’ve been fools’. We were then going again, but in that month, I had
been completely ignoring what my board had said, and carrying on regard-
less. (CG10, employee)
To tell you quite bluntly . . . I have lied to people [. . .] in order to take a
calculated risk. Because, if I’d said to people, we may have to pay all this
money back, they wouldn’t have gone ahead with the project. (CG9, board
member)
In both these cases, the individuals involved attributed their decision not
only to what they saw as a lack of understanding on the Board Members’
behalf, but especially to the time pressure they, as project leaders, were
under to complete their projects. Some felt that they had no choice but to
make decisions without gaining their board’s approval first, to meet exter-
nal deadlines:
When you work on such tight timelines and people are volunteering, it needs
one person to try and hold everything together. [. . .] There is a very clear
route to get this done. And . . . if anyone questions that, messes anything up,
that could destabilise the whole thing. (CG9, board member)
Respondents identified the increasing complexity of projects, and organisa-
tional structures, as a third reason for a possible lack of accountability.
Particularly, organisations that have taken on additional responsibilities or
established multiple energy projects often find their governance structure to
be increasingly complex, involving one or more subsidiary organisations.
This growth in institutional complexity brings with it new challenges,
especially for those with a small local population to draw volunteers
from. Groups require knowledgeable volunteers with sufficient free time
available, while also broadening participation and limiting conflicts of
interest, which can be a major issue in small communities (CG16,
employee).
Interviewees indicated that this increasing institutional complexity is not
always immediately accompanied by the implementation of new account-
ability procedures. While advice from external organisations is available,
groups often learn about good governance as they go along. It can be a
steep learning curve, sometimes risking a project or group’s survival alto-
gether. In one case, the increasingly blurred boundary between the volun-
tary community group and its trading subsidiary (which owned the energy
development)
. . .caused a lot of issues with regards to governance, because it was almost like
the tail wagging the dog. Trying to employ people within the Trading
Subsidiary to run the Trust. It became problematic. In fact, it was on the
brink of failure. (CG13, employee)
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Although there are support organisations who offer ‘governance health
checks’, interviewees indicated that this does not change the nature of the
problem: that they are reliant on a small number of volunteers to develop a
growing number of increasingly complex projects, often under significant
time pressure.
This section, and the previous one, showed that it can be difficult for
community groups to negotiate tensions around how to be inclusive and
representative of the wider community while meeting ‘very, very, very tight
deadlines’ (CG9, board member), primarily resulting from changes to
funding mechanisms, affecting how much communities will earn from
their projects. As a small number of individuals make many decisions
around the details of CE projects, it is important that the membership
can hold them to account. Interview data show, however, that individuals
driving a project forward do not always follow accountability procedures
because of a lack of sufficient time and knowledge, a pressure to meet tight
deadlines and the increasing complexity of projects and organisational
structures. A (perceived) lack of representativeness and accountability
from local leaders are challenges in themselves but can also be a source of
disagreement in communities or impede the satisfactory resolution of
disputes. The final section will consider this in more detail.
The challenges of dealing with disagreement
Interviewees agreed that differences of opinion are a normal part of com-
munity life. They therefore did not think that the presence of disagreements
was a cause for concern but did indicate that ‘[t]he strength of a community
depends on how you solve those disagreements’ (CG2, board member).
These interviews show, however, that some CE groups struggle to deal
with disagreement. One factor that respondents highlighted is the blurred
personal/professional boundary that employees or volunteers in these pro-
jects can experience. Respondents often attribute the strength of commu-
nity-level action to the close connection between those actively developing
the project and the wider community. However, some of the staff and
volunteers interviewed, especially those in small rural communities,
reported that ‘being embedded’ in the community can also make it difficult
to separate their professional from their personal lives. The ability of
residents to interact informally with local leaders can be positive aspect of
CE, but it also means that disagreements and differences of opinion are not
only expressed in formal settings, such as groups’ meetings, but also in
informal local spaces. For some, the only way to deal with this is to retreat
from community life:
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I tend to work from home and isolate myself so I don’t have to deal with
some of the negativity. It can make me feel miserable. (CG10, employee)
This reluctance to confront, often ongoing, criticism is very understandable.
However, as the experience of CG2 shows, this could have unintended con-
sequences and contribute to a downward spiral in community relations. This
group reported similar difficulties, with some local residents opposing a
proposed CE project. Opponents’ objections were not only concerned with
the proposed wind turbine but also with the anticipated income from the
project, and who would decide what it would be spent on. One local objector
admitted that his disagreement with the group over the turbine had ‘nothing to
do with energy, but everything to do with community’ (CG2). While argu-
ments against CE projects are often made on technological or environmental
grounds, this can mask the social and power struggles behind such disputes. In
this case, community leaders viewed this detractor’s arguments as simply the
latest chapter in the historically antagonistic relationship with the group’s
leaders. Nonetheless, some people in the community viewed community
leaders’ reluctance to engage with this, and other, detractors’ arguments as
an attempt to silence alternative voices.
While many groups reported experiencing some vocal opposition within
the community, this often fades over time. In the case of CG2, however, a court
case was necessary to resolve the dispute around their community wind
turbine. Although the Court ultimately permitted the project to go ahead, it
did question the group's handling of discontent. In particular as prior to the
case the community group had written to local objectors, stating that they (the
objectors) would be held liable for all legal expenses were the community
group to win.The Court questioned why the group had sought to ‘stifle the
expression of objections’ (anonymised Court quote).
This example shows the importance of arbitration in cases of community
disputes. As a staffmember of another community group noted: ‘There is often
the assumption that a community are working as one, but this is not the case
(CG10, employee)’. Differences and disagreements are part of community
projects as much as any other (energy) projects but can be difficult to handle.
The blurred personal/professional boundary that many community leaders
experience can partly explain this and is further exacerbated by the pressures
described in the previous sections. Due to the pressure to deliver timely out-
comes, respondents often saw engaging detractors as a distracting and time-
consuming process that can sap the energy from staff and volunteers.
Nonetheless, as the Court decision above indicates, allowing objections to
be vented may help to combat a lingering sense of grievance towards a group
and its activities. Additionally, in this case, these objections not only delayed
the project’s development but also resulted in a significant legal bill.
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Considering the time and financial pressures groups are under, this is some-
thing many can ill-afford, and which early intervention may prevent.
Concluding discussion
I have sought to challenge the ‘romanticised narrative’ that CE groups can always
be considered ‘democratic’ (Simcock 2016, p.475; see also Walker et al. 2010,
McHarg 2016) while also being empathetic towards the challenges communities
face. Supporting earlier research (Johnson 2004, Simcock 2014), this research
shows that while respondents deem inclusivity to be important, the ideals of
inclusive decision-making and robust accountability procedures can be at odds
with the practicalities of meeting them. It also shows that the nominal inclusion
of (previously) underrepresented groups in decision-making does not automa-
tically guarantee a transfer of power, as internal forms of exclusion may remain
(Young 2000). Finally, perhaps somewhat in contrast to Islar and Busch (2016),
the findings on dispute-handling show that while many communities seek to
govern based on cooperation and consensus-building, agonistic processes of
contestation and negotiation are also part of the day-to-day reality of democratic
governance. Combined, these findings demonstrate the varied ways in which
communities establish democratic rules, and the different ways in which these
rules are followed, negotiated and at times subverted. Although ED advocates
often present community as apolitical, this may indicate that the community
sphere is in fact politicised through community-level action, as these groups are
required to engage in decisions around key issues of democratic governance –
such as representation, participation and accountability – which are equally
relevant to governance processes beyond the community scale.
This research builds on earlier, in-depth, case study research (e.g. Simcock
2014, 2016), by adopting a broader approach, involving 15 different community
groups. Due to the limited availability of existing research on how CE projects
enact governance, this approach furthered an understanding of which practices
or experiences were commonly experienced or unique to a single case. This
approach also has limitations, particularly around how representative the views
of a single interviewee are. I have sought tomitigate this by carrying out three in-
depth case studies. This highlighted the issue of internal exclusion, which can
often be subtler in nature and will not be universally experienced or recognised
(Young 2000). Further extensive in-depth qualitative research, in particular
participant observation, could offer additional insights on this matter.
Beyond Scotland and beyond energy – the wider applicability of these
findings
CE is now an internationally recognised concept (REN21 2016), and the
language of ED is also gaining ground in numerous countries, especially
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Germany (Weis et al. 2015, Angel 2016). While Scotland is not a frontrun-
ner in the CE or ED movements, it can be considered part of the next wave:
there have been government support mechanisms for CE for over 15 years,
and recent government discourse has incorporated the notion of ED. My
findings thus offer insights into how the concept of ED spreads and
translates into new national contexts and highlight the role of specific
geographic and material contexts on how ED is enacted.
For example, unlike in most countries, where energy cooperatives are the
dominant form of CE (Haggett and Quiroz-Aitken 2015), the majority of CE
groups in Scotland do not distribute income from their energy development
to individual group members but use their income solely to fund community
development projects. CE groups therefore experience challenges and dis-
agreement not only regarding the development of their energy project but
also regarding the governance of subsequent income streams, an issue that
gets to the heart of whose vision(s) for the future of a community prevails
(van Veelen and Haggett 2017). It is therefore during this post-installation
phase that some community groups began to address the issue of diversity, to
ensure that the income from the energy project is managed in a way that is
representative of the needs and wants of the community. Thus, while Angel
(2016) and Grossmann and Creamer (2017) have also highlighted a lack of
diversity and inclusivity in community initiatives in other European con-
texts, this research shows that the nature of Scottish projects means these are
perhaps more likely to become points of contention.
This finding is interesting in light of previous research that considers the
question of who is part of the ‘democratic public’ (Walker 2009, Marres and
Lezaun 2011, Simcock 2014). It highlights that the question ‘who is affected?’ not
only has a geographical dimension (Simcock 2014, 2016) but also amaterial one.
Here, ideas of inclusivity and the notion of who should be included in decision-
making changed after the energy technology was installed. Rather than being
characterised by its technological dimensions, it is now characterised by its socio-
economic ones instead. This finding thus resonates with Chilvers and Longhurst
(2016) argument that participation is ‘both shaped by and actively construct[s]
human subjectivities, objects of concern, and models of participation’ (p.590).
The complexity of the material dimensions of CE may play a particularly
important role in shaping participation during the development phase. For
example, I showed it to pose specific accountability challenges, with voluntary
board members reportedly lacking the necessary skills (and time to acquire
them) to oversee every aspect of a project. The nature of the Scottish CE sector
– with many groups located in small, rural communities – also contributes to
this problem. Further research into different national contexts with different
models of CE, and the impact of the material dimension on participation in
decision-making, including different understandings of ‘who is affected’ in
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relation to negative impacts (visual, noise) versus positive impacts (financial
gain), could provide valuable further insights.
Finally, this research asks ‘what is democracy, to whom?’ I show that com-
munity governance practices are based on both local and extra-local considera-
tions. The importance of local contexts was particularly noticeable in relation to
inclusivity, with several groups seeking to enhance inclusivity and diversity in
their decision-making bodies in different ways. Others adopted amore ‘passively
inclusive’ approach but may risk (inadvertently) reproducing pre-existing power
relations by relying on ‘local leaders’ to take projects forward (Young 2000,
Simcock 2016, Grossmann and Creamer 2017). At the same time, external
factors and actors also shape internal CE governance. While this is not unique
to CE (see e.g. Creamer 2015), there is some evidence that suggests that this is
exacerbated by the extensive interactions between CE groups and other actors.
This research shows that the importance of meeting externally set deadlines (for
example due to changes in funding) can have unintended consequences for
governance practices. Additionally, other research has shown that intermediary
organisations have played a particularly important role in developing CE across
the United Kingdom, including in shaping community governance (Hargreaves
et al. 2013, Parag et al. 2013, Parag and Janda 2014). Not only do intermediaries
offer governance ‘health checks’ or mediation but sometimes also prescribe the
parameters for participation. This raises both practical and normative questions:
how are different meanings and practices of democratic governance translated
through these governance networks and whose meanings prevail? Is, or should,
democracy be perceived as a set of locally situated practices or universal princi-
ples? The emergence of ED in different national contexts and involvement of
different actors at different ‘levels’ of government thus raises the question of how
to reconcile potentially different visions of democracy. This research should
therefore constitute one necessary step towards an emerging evidence base
seeking to understand the complex dynamics of ED.
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